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L ess than fifteen years ago, the criminal investigation of corporate
and individual environmental polluters was not a high priority for
most federal and state prosecutors. Since then, this attitude certainly
has changed. Today, almost every state and federal prosecutor's office
has at least one specialist who exclusively investigates and prosecutes
environmental crime.' This increased interest in criminal environ-
mental prosecution arose, in part, in response to the recent enactment
of innovative federal and state legislation providing severe criminal
felony sanctions for "knowing," "reckless," or even "negligent" viola-
tions of environmental statutes. For example, at the federal level,
both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA") 2 and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 3 include crimes with
a "knowing endangerment" mens rea that provide for up to fifteen
years imprisonment for criminally culpable individuals. These "know-
ing endangerment" crimes have been hailed by prosecutors as an im-
* Assistant Attorney General, New York State Department of Law, Office of
the Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau; B.A., 1979, State Univer-
sity of New York-Oneonta; J.D., 1984, State University of New York-Buffalo; L.L.M.,
1993, Pace University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws-A Na-
tional Priority, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775, 776 (1991) (policy of criminal prosecu-
tions hds developed over past two decades). See also Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. et al.,
Criminal Enforcement of State Environmental Laws: The Ohio Solution, 14 HARV.
ENVrL. L. REV. 217, 218 n.3 (1990) (39 states have enacted criminal air pollution
statutes and all 50 have criminal water pollution and hazardous waste laws). For a
discussion of state and local enforcement systems, see Mark S. Pollock, Local Prose-
cution of Environmental Crime, 22 ENVTL. L. 1405 (1992), and R. Christopher Locke,
Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and The Complexities of Compliance,
16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 312 (1991) (many states have developed programs simi-
lar to federal program for criminal enforcement of environmental laws).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For RCRA's "knowing endan-
germent" provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (also known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act). For CWA's "knowing endangerment" provision, see 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988).
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portant additional weapon in the federal environmental enforcement
arsenal.4
Although "knowing endangerment" crimes were not drafted solely
as worker safety laws, Congress definitely intended their jurisdiction
to include the workplace.' Recent prosecutions under RCRA and
CWA confirm that federal prosecutors intend to enforce "knowing en-
dangerment" criminal provisions as part of their effort to safeguard
workers from life-threatening conditions imposed by their employers.6
In 1990, when Congress enacted the Clean Air Act ("CAA")
Amendments,7 it created the crime of "knowing endangerment" by
incorporating features from similar provisions of RCRA and CWA.
Like its earlier counterparts, the amended CAA is armed with severe
penalties.' This potentially powerful prosecutorial weapon, however,
may prove to be little more than a "paper tiger" in the federal court-
room. Successful prosecution of this "knowing endangerment" crime
demands additional burdens of proof that prosecutors have not previ-
ously faced under similar "knowing endangerment" statutes. In addi-
tion, this "knowing endangerment" crime may not apply to conduct in.
which employees are endangered by hazardous air pollutants released
from inside, rather than outside, the confines of the workplace. In
light of these potential legal pitfalls, it may be the states, rather than
the federal government, that, in their traditional role, of ensuring
worker safety, must prosecute criminal conduct surrounding hazard-
ous air pollutant releases that create a substantial risk of injury to em-
ployees within the workplace.
This Article explores the problems in using the "knowing endanger-
ment" provisions of the CAA Amendments to protect workers from
hazardous air pollutants in the workplace. Part I briefly examines the
development of criminalenvironmental statutes that led to the enact-
ment of the crime of "knowing endangerment" under the CAA
Amendments. Part II analyzes the elements federal prosecutors must
prove under this new "knowing endangerment" crime and, in particu-
lar, its jurisdictional limitations concerning life-threatening air re-
leases occurring inside the physical confines of the workplace. Part III
compares prosecutions under the "knowing endangerment" provi-
4. Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Comment, Criminalizing Occupational Safety Viola-
tions: The Use of "Knowing Endangerment" Statutes To Punish Employers Who Main-
tain Toxic Working Conditions, 14 HARV. ENwrL. L. REV. 487 (1990).
5. Id at 490.
6. United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992) (prosecution under
CWA); United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989) (prosecution
under RCRA).
7. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671 (Supp.'V 1993)).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A), (B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (first offenses under the
"knowing endangerment" provision of the CAA Amendments by an individual carry
a prison sentence of up to 15 years, and violations by a corporation carry a fine of up
to $1 million).
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sions of the CAA Amendments with those of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act ("OSHA"). Part IV examines some of the legal chal-
lenges and opportunities that state prosecutors may face under state
law if they prosecute,.similar criminal environmental conduct that en-
dangers worker safety. This Article concludes with a discussion of the
role of state prosecutors in protecting the workplace.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES LEADING UP TO THE CREATION OF THE CRIME
OF "KNOWING ENDANGERMENT" UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR Acr
A. Federal Criminal Environmental Legislation Which Leads to the
Creation of "Knowing Endangerment" Crimes-
Federal criminal environmental statutes have been in existence
since the nineteenth century. The Rivers and Harbors Act9 was en-
acted by Congress in 1899. Under this early environmental statute,
Congress made it a federal misdemeanor to throw, .deposit, or dis-
charge any refuse matter, other than that flowing from sewers and
streets, into any body of navigable water of the United States. 10 The
Rivers and Harbors Act, however, was rarely utilized by federal pros-
ecutors until about sixty years after its enactment and then only
sparingly. 1
Federal criminal prosecution of individual and corporate environ-
mental polluters on a comprehensive scale is a recent development.
Until the late 1970s, virtually all enforcement of federal environmen-
tal laws relied solely upon the use of civil remedies such as administra-
tive actions, injunctions, and court actions for civil penalties. For
example, between 1972 and 1974, the Department of Justice indicted a
total of only fifteen defendants for violations of federal environmental
laws.' 2
One reason for the lack of criminal enforcement actions brought
during the 1970s was that existing federal environmental statutes had
made it difficult for prosecutors to prove criminally culpable con-
duct.' 3 Even when culpability could be proven, federal environmental
statutes provided for only modest criminal sanctions. 4 By the late
1970s, howeyer, many federal prosecutors realized that criminal,
rather than civil, enforcement actions were often needed to ensure
9. Also known as the Refuse Act, Pub. L. No. 55-425, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
11. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (case tried under Rivers
& Harbors Act).
12. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 219.
13. H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5614.
14. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 219.
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that "bad actors" would comply with environmental statutes. Civil en-
forcement actions seeking damages against large corporations for civil
penalties often provided little more than a "slap on the wrist" to those
corporations and their culpable corporate officers.' 5 In many situa-
tions, the costs of civil penalties were simply passed on to the con-
sumer by the corporation in the form of higher prices.16 In addition,
during the late 1970s, American society's attitude toward the environ-
ment began to change. The public began to view corporate environ-
mental violators as public health threats and demanded strict criminal
environmental sanctions against "bad actors.' 1 7 A 1984 public opin-
ion poll by the Department of Justice revealed that environmental
criminal conduct was viewed as more serious than many historically
notorious crimes, such as heroin smuggling, bank robbery, and at-
tempted murder.18
In response to the public's demand for stricter enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws, Congress revised existing environmental statutes in
the 1980s to increase criminal sanctions and lower the burden of proof
necessary for establishing criminal culpability. Moreover, Congress
also created new environmental crimes, such as the crime of "knowing
endangerment" found in RCRA, as amended in 1984, and the CWA
Amendments of 1987.19 Although RCRA's.objective, to regulate the
treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste;20
has the tone of an administrative statute geared toward protecting
public health and welfare, the "knowing endangerment" provision
provided the first felony-level criminal sanctions in any federal envi-
ronmental statute.2' As originally drafted,22 the "knowing endanger-
15. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("While the imposition of maximum penalties against a large corporation may
amount to little more than a slap on the wrist, the same penalties may throw a small
enterprise out of business."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
16. Id. at 551 (court wrestled with the problem of offenders who found penalties
less costly than proper behavior; court spoke of the "necessity to induce vigilant pos-
ture" and of how the "reckless disregard of injunctions warrants the highest penalty
prescribed").
17. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 217-18 (citing U.S. DEP'T JUST. STAT. BULL.
2 (Jan. 1984)).
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988) (RCRA's "knowing endangerment" section) and
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (CWA's "knowing endangerment"
section).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(8), (b) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
22. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1982), which
established a three-prong test for guilt under the "knowing endangerment" criminal
provision. Under the former statute's test, one could be punished only when one:
(1) knowingly handled any hazardous waste in violation of RCRA and
(2) knew at that time that he thereby placed another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury, and
(3) provided that his conduct in the circumstances manifested an unjustified and
inexcusable disreard or extreme indifference towards human life or injury.
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ment" provision was a federal prosecutor's "evidentiary nightmare"
because it was virtually impossible to prove the accused possessed all
three different forms of scienter or knowledge required to sustain a
conviction.2 3 Congress acknowledged this flaw in 1984 when it re-
drafted RCRA's "knowing endangerment" provision into the present
form and, in particular, eliminated the third element of knowledge.24
Since the 1984 amendment, RCRA's "knowing endangerment" crime
has been successfully used by federal prosecutors to help ensure
worker safety.25.
CWA was enacted to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, ' 26 and did not contain
a "knowing endangerment" provision in its original 1972 language.
After amending RCRA in 1984, Congress added a similar "knowing
endangerment"- crime to CWA in its 1987 Amendments. The CWA
"knowing endangerment" crime punishes "any person who knowingly
violates [various sections of the CWA] and who knows at that time that
he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injury. 27
It was hoped that this new arsenal of felony-level environmental
crimes and accompanying sanctions would arm federal prosecutors for
the first time with effective weapons against recalcitrant environmen-
tal violators. Corporate officers now faced the loss of their liberty, as
well as their wealth and position, when corporate conduct under their
control disregarded environmental compliance standards. In practice,
federal prosecutors have had mixed results when using the crime of
"knowing endangerment" against corporate managers who had been
accused of endangering worker safety. Nonetheless, the draconian
criminal sanctions accompanying this "super felony" under RCRA
and CWA will promote its continued use in appropriate environmen-
tal prosecutions in the future.
The deterrence value of these "super felonies" under RCRA and
CWA convinced Congress to provide a similar provision when it
amended the CAA in 1990.29 Before this "knowing endangerment
23. H.R. REP. No. 198, supra note 13, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5614 (knowing endangerment provision was amended because the "original language
render[ed] the 'Knowing Endangerment' provision unnecessarily restrictive and may
well have contributed to the fact that since its enactment in 1980, there ha[d] not been
a single indictment under this provision,").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
25. See generally United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir;
1989),
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
28. United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992) (vacated conviction
against corporation and its president for illegally discharging wastes into a public
sewer system).
29. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 362-63 (1989), reprinted in 1990'
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3745-46.
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crime" is discussed, however, it is informative to provide a short his-
tory of air pollution crimes prior to this recent development.
B. Overview of the Development of Criminal Air Pollution Laws
The establishment of strict criminal sanctions for the violation of air
pollution laws is not new to Anglo-American jurisprudence. In medi-
eval England during the thirteenth century, the sovereign enacted a
smoke abatement ordinance that forbade the burning of coal in the
City of London.3" The criminal sanction for a person found guilty of
this early air pollution crime was swift, severe, and permanent-sum-
mary execution. 31 In the United States, criminal sanctions for the vio-
lation of air pollution statutes were not available until the age of
urban industrialization in the late nineteenth century. 32 State and local
air pollution prosecutions were usually limited to the use of criminal
nuisance laws or local smoke control ordinances enacted by munici-
palities, where applicable.33
When the increased presence of industry was accompanied by a
concomitant increase in air pollution and other offensive treatment of
the surrounding community, these statutes were supplemented by the
common-law crime of public nuisance. Examples of, prosecutors' use
of common-law and statutory crimes exist in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century. For example, New York State prosecutors in the
nineteenth century indicted a gaslight company president for nuisance
by causing "unwholesome smells, smokes and stenches, rendering the
air corrupt, offensive, uncomfortable and unwholesome. ' 34 Often, in -
dictments such as these were dismissed when the defendant demon-.
strated that the business was essential to the public and was conducted
using the best known technology of the time. 5
However, in one case in which the defendant plant or factory failed
to show that nauseating fumes and other pollutants were a necessary
consequence of proper plant operation, a later criminal nuisance con-
30. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND
POLICY 156 (2d ed. 1990).
31. Id. As can be surmised, this draconian criminal sanction must have been an
effective deterrent to many potential polluters living in thirteenth century London!
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. People v. The President, and C., of the New York Gas-Light Co., 6 Lans. 467,
467-68 (1st Dep't 1872).
35. The "best technology available" defense was successful in New York Gas-Light
Co., a criminal case, in which the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment
and drew a distinction between the civil and criminal aspects of the case by saying, "It
may be that private persons can maintain an action for damages .... but the people are
barred by the act which their legislature have [sic] passed from making a public com-
plaint by an indictment for such a cause, while the defendants conduct their business
with skill, science and care." Id. at 468 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
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viction was upheld.36 An illustration of the use of a municipal smoke
control ordinance is found in a 1937 misdemeanor prosecution by the
New York County District Attorney'against the Cunard Steamship
Line.37 The criminal informations charged, in substance, that two of
the Cunard's steamships, the Queen Mary and the Laconia, had ille-
gally discharged smoke into the air from their respective stacks while
docked in New York Harbor.38 The Manhattan County Criminal
Court found the Cunard Line guilty of violating both criminal charges
under the smoke control ordinance. 39 However, this early environ-
mental prosecutor's victory was short-lived. The conviction against
the Cunard Line was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals,
which reasoned that the Cunard Line had used the best available tech-
nology to limit emissions from each of the steamship's stacks.4 0 Not
surprisingly, there were few other published accounts of attempted
prosecutions of violators of smoke control ordinances or similar air
pollution laws.
During. the 1940s and 1950s, air pollution worsened in America's
industrialized areas, and many urban residents began to suffer lung
and other respiratory related health problems.4 " One of the most no-
torious examples occurred in the western Pennsylvania coal town of
Donora in 1948, where almost half of its residents fell ill and twenty
individuals died due to the effects of air pollution. 2 Nonetheless, for
the next twenty years, little was done at the federal, state, or local
levels of government to help alleviate this increasingly pervasive pub-
lic health problem.4 3 Although Congress increased state and local
funding for air pollution research and for enforcement, air pollution
and its accompanying public health effects continued to worsen."4
Itwas not until the CAA was passed in 1970 that Congress made its
first comprehensive attempt to regulate air pollution on a national
scale.4 The formidable goals of the CAA are to protect and enhance
the quality of the nation's air.4 6 Main components of the statute in-
clude implementation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
36. People v. Schissel, 84 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (upholding convic-
tion for violation of then-existing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1530 (public nuisance); also up-
holding conviction of defendant based on proof that he was merely person in charge
of the plant producing fumes, noise and glare, Id. at 437).
37. People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 21 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1939) (ordinance in
question was then-existing NEW YORK, N.Y., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 20, art. 12,
§ 211' (1936) (sanitary code relating to smoke discharge).
38. Cunard White Star, 21 N.E.2d at 489.
39. Id.
40. Id. The defendant did not challenge its conviction on a third count relating to
discharging smoke from a nearby chimney.




45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
46. 42 U.S.C § 7401(b) (1988).
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("NAAQS") for priority'air pollutants,47 and of National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air, Pollutants ("NESHAPS") by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). States are required to de-
velop State Implementation Plans ("SIPs") that set emission
standards for stationary (industrial plants) and mobile sources (vehi-
cles) of pollution that meet NAAQS and NESHAPS.48 In addition to
providing civil regulatory standards and accompanying sanctions, the
CAA included Congress's first attempt to draft a comprehensive body
of federal environmental crimes to help ensure regulatory compli-
ance. 49 Yet, the CAA's original criminal enforcement section was
weak and rarely used by federal prosecutors; for example, it author-
ized misdemeanor, rather than felony, prosecutions against violators
and provided for only nominal criminal sanctions. °
During the next twenty years, the criminal provisions of the CAA
remained unchanged. Not surprisingly, few criminal cases under the
CAA were brought by federal prosecutors during this period. Instead,
federal prosecutors investigated criminal violations under other envi-
ronmental statutes, suchas RCRA and CWA, in which Congress had
enacted strict felony criminal sanctions for "knowing endangerment"
crimes, and, for many other environmental felonies, had decreased the
burden of proving the accused's mens rea or criminal intent.5 "
In 1990, Congress finally acknowledged that the strict criminal sanc-
tions and relaxed mens rea requirements found in other federal envi-
ronmental statutes should be applied to the CAA 2.5  For instance,
almost all "knowing" violations under the 1990 Amendments became
felony-level crimes.5 3 Congress also added a felony-level crime of
"knowing endangerment" for a knowing release of a hazardous air
pollutant that endangers another person.54 This "knowing endanger-
ment" crime, purposely modelled after similar provisions found in
RCRA and CWA,5 5 is committed under the CAA when:
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
48. 42 U.S.C §§ 7410, 7412 (1988).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1970).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1970). It was not until RCRA was enacted in 1976 that
violations rose to felony status, and even then prosecution was difficult. See supra
notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
51. For an analysis of the relaxation of these criminal intent requirements in fed-
eral environmental criminal prosecutions, see Michael S. Elder, The Criminal Provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: A Continuation of the Trend Toward
Criminalization of Environmental Violations, 3 FORDHAM EN rL. L. REP. 141, 153
(1992).
52. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 362-63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3746-47.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
55. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 364, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746-
47.
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any person knowingly releases into the ambient air any of the 189
hazardous air pollutants listed in section 112 of the Act or an ex-
tremely hazardous substance under section 306(2) of CERCLA and
who knows at the time of the, release that he or she places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.56
The strong sanctions for this "knowing endangerment" crime are simi-
lar to those found under its counterparts in RCRA and CWA.57 Any
person found criminally culpable is subject to a fine of up to $250,000,
and up to fifteen years in federal prison.58 Any organization found
criminally culpable is subject to a fine of up to $1 million.59 Congress
endorsed harsh criminal penalties for these air polluters because it
specifically recognized the serious threat that such conduct can pose
to human health.6°
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF
"KNOWING ENDANGERMENT" UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
Although Congress lifted many of the key terms in the "knowing
endangerment" provision of the CAA Amendments directly from the
"knowing endangerment" crime provisions in RCRA and CWA, the
CAA Amendments' provision contains some specific nuances for fed-
eral courts and prosecutors. Federal courts will have to grapple with
the meaning of a number of terms before prosecution of the crime of
"knowing endangerment" can be successfully and consistently utilized
under the CAA Amendments.
A. A "Person"
Under the general definition section of the CAA, the statutory
meaning of the term "any person" is expansive and includes natural
persons, business and government entities, and officers, agents, and
employees of such entities.61 In addition, under the general criminal
enforcement section of the CAA, the term "any person" includes any
"responsible corporate officer."62 This inclusion of "any responsible
corporate officer" expands the scope of individuals who can be subject
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
57. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text regarding "knowing endanger-
ment" provisions of RCRA and CWA.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. V 1993). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
60. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 364, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747-
48.
61. Under the CAA, a "person" includes "an individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a State, and any agency, de-
partment, or instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent, or employee
thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (1977).
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to criminal prosecution for CAA violations. Where applicable, the
provision authorizes a federal prosecutor to charge corporate officers
or other senior management personnel within the targeted corpora-
tion even when these individuals did 'not directly participate in the
charged criminal conduct.63
In the prosecution of environmental crimes, the "responsible corpo-
rate officer" doctrine has two concerns: fairness and deterrence. Pros-
ecutors view the doctrine as fair because the defendant official was
often in a position to prevent the violation, especially when the
subordinate's conduct is within the officer's area of supervision or
control.64 Under these circumstances, officials should not be able to
delegate criminal responsibility for the conduct of their subordinates.
The deterrent value of the doctrine is best seen when it would be easy
to prosecute the plant manager or middle-level corporate employee
who caused the violation. But the deterrent effect of such a prosecu-
tion on the corporation would be minimal unless a corporate officer or
other senior manager, whose policies or direct orders led to the crimi-
nal environmental conduct, is also held accountable.65
The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine has been applied suc-
cessfully in the federal prosecution of Johnson & Towers, Inc. for a
hazardous Waste crime under RCRA.66 In United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court that found two
managers of a waste disposal operation criminally culpable of know-
ingly disposing of hazardous waste without a permit.67 The court held
that the jury could infer a defendant's degree of knowledge of the
requirement of a hazardous waste permit' based, in part, upon his
"requisite responsible position" within the corporation.68 Although a
corporate officer's position by itself is not sufficient proof for a know-
ing violation, the application of the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine allows a jury to infer criminal culpability based upon the of-
ficer's position and other direct or circumstantial 'evidence submitted
by the prosecutor at trial, such as evidence of information provided to
those defendants on prior occasions.69
63. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
64. There is a distinction between a "responsible" corporate officer and a corpo-
rate officer, such as a vice-president of human resources, who may not ordinarily be
held accountable. The distinction is not a clear one, and is discussed infra notes 66-71
and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (owners
and employees are covered under RCRA's criminal provision, but employees "can be
subject to criminal prosecution only if they know or should have known that there
had been no compliance" with RCRA's permit requirement).
66. Id. at 662.
67. Id at 664-:65.
68. Id. See also United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 55 (1st Cir. 1991).
69. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
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Because the CAA Amendments expressly provide for criminal lia-
bility of a "responsible corporate officer," it may appear that a corpo-
rate officer who fails to' prevent the commission of a "knowing
endangerment" crime that was within his or her area of supervision
may be successfully prosecuted, even though he or she did not directly
participate in the charged criminal conduct. However, Congress has
limited the potential scope of prosecutions of such "knowing" viola-
tions under CAA. For a "knowing" violation, the statutory definition
of "person," which includes a "responsible corporate officer," explic-
itly excludes an employee who is "carrying out his normal activities
and who is acting under orders from the employer."70 Arguably, cor-
porate officers as well as employees who perform their "normal activi-
ties" and who act under orders from their "employer" would be
immune from prosecution. The legislative history suggests that this
limitation reflected congressional concerns about the expansive scope
of "persons" in corporate management who could be found criminally
culpable of CAA's severe sanctions for a "knowing" crime.71
Specifically, the Senate Minority feared that prosecution under
these "knowing" provisions would somehow lead to widespread crimi-
nal convictions of responsible environmental managers for good-faith
or technical violations.72 While it is reasonable to surmise that the
intent of Congress behind this provision was to protect lower-level
management and line employees who are ordered by their superiors
to perform the charged environmental violation, the statute and the
legislative history fail to provide any insight to prosecutors about how
.high up the "corporate ladder" this statutory provision may apply.
Although this provision certainly will not shield high-ranking corpo-
rate officers, at least one commentator has suggested that even a se-
nior management official may argue that the charged criminal conduct
was part of his or her normal activities under the orders of his or her
superior. 73 If the officer meets this threshold, a prosecutor must es-
tablish that the release was both "knowing and willful," a burden of
proof that is often insurmountable.74 Until more definitive guidance
is provided by the courts, even senior corporate management person-
nel will contend that the "normal activities" exception is applicable to
them. This statutory limitation, unlike any found in other federal en-
vironmental statutes, categorizes the degree of the prosecutor's bur-
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. V 1993).
71. See generally S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29.
72. Id. at 488, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866 (minority views of Senator
Symms).
73. James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the
Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 281, 387 (1992).
74. Id. at 384.
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den of proof based upon a corporate employee's activities and status
within the organization.75
B. Who "Knowingly" Releases
Neither the term "knowing" nor the term "willful" is defined in the
CAA Amendments of 1990. However, what constitutes "knowing"
conduct under the CAA was interpreted by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Buckley,76 which affirmed the conviction of a defendant
charged with "knowingly" violating asbestos emission provisions. In
that case, the defendant contended that he had no knowledge of the
statute and therefore could not be convicted of knowingly violating
the CAA.7 7 The court held that the prosecutor need only show that
the defendant knew of the emissions themselves and had knowledge
of the statute or the hazards the emissions impose.78
This reasoning is similar to the manner in which the term "know-
ingly" has been interpreted in other environmental statutes. 79 For in-
stance, to show "knowing" conduct under RCRA, the majority of
federal circuits concur that the prosecution need only prove generally
that the defendant committed the offensive conduct, not that the de-
fendant knowingly violated the law.8 1 Similarly under CWA, the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Weitzenhoff1 interpreted "know-
ingly" as only requiring the prosecutor to prove that the defendants
were aware that they were discharging the pollutants at issue; there
was no requirement to prove that the defendants knew they were vio-
lating the statute or permit.82 Thus, the jury was instructed that the
prosecutor need not show that the defendants knew that their acts or
omissions' were unlawful.8 3 The SupremeCourt has not ruled on the
definition of the term "knowingly" in an environmental case. None-
theless, the Court has acknowledged this lower standard of proof for
other public welfare statutes.84
75. Id. at 386-88. The new definition of "person" under the Clean Air Act
Amendments "shall not include an employee who is carrying out his normal activities
and who is not a part of senior management personnel or a corporate officer [and
except for knowing and willful violations] shall not include an employee who is carry-
ing out his normal activities and who is acting under orders from the employer." 42
U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. V 1993).
76. 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 86-87.
78. Id at 87-88.
79. J. Joseph Korpics, United States v. Protex Industries Inc.: Corporate Criminal
Liability Under RCRA 's "Knowing Endangerment" Provision, 28 Hous. L. REv. 449
(1991).
80. Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Require-
ment of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
862, 872 (1991).
81. 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
82. Id. at 1529.
83. Id.
84. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1970).
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Applying this standard to the "knowledge" element of a "knowing
endangerment" crime under the CAA, the prosecutor need only show
that the defendant knew that he or she was releasing a noxious air
emission into the ambient air. The prosecutor is not required to show
that the defendant knew that the air emission was listed as a hazard-
ous air pollutant under section 112 of the CAA, or that it was listed as
an extremely hazardous substance under section 306 of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). 85
As with other environmental statutes designed to protect the public
welfare, courts will impose upon a prosecutor only a general intent
standard for proving "knowing" criminal conduct. However, if the de-
fendant shows that, he or she released the hazardous air emission
while carrying out his or her normal activities under orders from a
superior, the prosecutor must meet the additional burden of proving
that the release was "willful."'8 6 The term "willful" is not defined
under the CAA, but the legislative history provides that the term
"does not require the government to prove that the accused knew-that
he had violated a provision of the Clean Air Act.... It is sufficient for
the government to prove the accused's knowledge that he was com-
mitting an unlawful act. '""
The first part of this statement appears to support the view of most
federal courts that ignorance of the law is no excuse. However, when
read with the second part of the statement, the applicable standard of
intent is, at best, unclear. Although the Senate acknowledges that
there is no need to show knowledge of the applicable CAA provision,
the second part of the statement shows that the prosecutor still must
demonstrate that the accused knew the conduct was unlawful.8 If the
prosecutor need not show knowledge of a violation of the CAA, then
under what law can he or she show knowledge of unlawfulness? How
else can a prosecutor show an accused's knowledge that his or her
conduct was unlawful unless the prosecutor shows that the accused
has at least some awareness of the legal requirements of the CAA
itself? Here, the legislative history provides more questions than an-
swers for federal prosecutors regarding what is "willful" conduct
under the CAA.
85. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code and Titles 10, 29, 33, and 42 of the United States Code).
Although a prosecutor may not be required to show that a defendant had knowledge
of the hazardous nature of the substance released, a defendant's good faith belief that
the substance was harmless may nevertheless be a defense. See United States v. John-
son & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v.
United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
86. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussion of scienter).
87. CHAFEE-BAUCUS STATEMENT OF SENATE MANAGERS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 CONG. REC. S16,895, 16,933-51 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
88. Id.
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While a standard for evaluating "willfulness" under the CAA
Amendments is lacking, there is a standard for evaluating whether
conduct is "willful" in other, non-environmentally related federal stat-
utes. For example, in Cheek v. United States,89 a criminal prosecution
under the Internal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court defined "will-
ful" conduct to require that the prosecutor negate a defendant's good-
faith belief that he or she misunderstood the applicable law or stan-
dard. The Supreme Court reasoned that the element of willfulness is
an exception to the well-settled legal principle that ignorance of the
law is no excuse.90 In Ratzlaff v. United States,91 a' more recent crimi-
nal prosecution under the Bank Secrecy Act, the government accused
the defendant of "willfully" violating its reporting requirement.92 The
Supreme Court held that the government had to prove that the de-
fendant knew that the filing of such reports was legally mandated.93
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsberg held that there should be
a presumption against treating statutory terms as surplusage.94 To de-
termine if criminal conduct is "willful," the government must prove
some additional element of knowledge on the part of the defendant,
other than the general-intent standard, in the case of a "knowing"
violation.9"
It is uncertain what comprises the substance of this additional ele-
ment needed by the federal prosecutor to prove a "knowing" and
"willful" air emission violation under the CAA's "knowing endanger-
ment" statute. It will be up to the federal courts to clarify the parame-
ters of this mental state. In light of the contradictory legislative
guidance on the meaning of "willful" conduct under the CAA and the
Supreme Court's analysis of "willful" conduct in other criminal stat-
utes, defense counsel best serves his or her client by contending that
some knowledge of the CAA must be shown on the part of the ac-
cused to sustain a conviction for a "knowing and willful" violation.
This additional burden upon the prosecutor to prove willful conduct
hasbeen characterized as encouraging senior and mid-level managers
to remain ignorant of specific CAA provisions. Although a manager's
ignorance cannot provide a shield from criminal culpability under the
general-intent "knowing" standard, he or she may nonetheless avoid
criminal culpability under the specific-intent element of a "knowing
and willful" standard.96 Certainly, a corporate policy discouraging in-
house training on compliance with the CAA is contradictory to,con-
gressional intent as evidenced in its legislative history, which encour-
89. 498 U.S. 192, 201-202 (1991).
90. Id.
91. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
92. Id at 657.
93. Id. at 659-63.
94. Id. at 658-59.
95. Id. at 659-60.
96. Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 73, at 384-85.
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ages corporate self-monitoring and overall corporate environmental
awareness.
97
This necessity of proving "willful" conduct may also hinder environ-
mental criminal investigations under the CAA. Often, the middle-
level corporate managers cut costs on environmental compliance and
order lower-level employees to perform conduct that may violate an
environmental statute.98 A criminal investigation of a corporation for
such conduct often begins with the questioning of these lower-level
employees who are immunized by the prosecutor in exchange for tes-
timony regarding the lack of environmental training and compliance
at the targeted corporation. Once apprised by counsel of the govern-
ment's burden, an employee who acted in his normal job capacity
under orders from a superior may have little incentive to cooperate
with law enforcement officiers because the employee may believe that
he or she is virtually immune from prosecution anyway. The em-
ployee may believe he or she has little to gain and much to lose by
cooperating with the prosecutor.
C. Into the "Ambient Air"
Yet another obstacle for the federal prosecutor under the CAA is
the scope and meaning of the term "ambient air." Under the CAA,
the EPA implemented a restrictive interpretation of the term "ambi-
ent air" that includes only that portion of the atmosphere, external to
buildings, to which the general public has access. 99 If this interpreta-
tion were literally applied and coupled with the "knowing endanger-
ment" provision of the CAA, prosecutors would be limited to
investigating knowing releases of air pollutants into the atmosphere
outside a facility or building of the workplace, effectively eliminating
threats of prosecution to employers unless their employees worked
outdoors in public areas. 100 At least one legal commentator has sug-
gested that the inclusion of the term "ambient air" under the "know-
ing endangerment" provision was simply one of the many
congressional drafting errors in the final version of the 1990 Amend-
ments. 101 This conclusion is supported, in part, • by the fact that the
affirmative defenses provided in the statute to a "knowing endanger-
ment" crime make no distinction between hazards from inside or
97. For a discussion of congressional intent regarding corporate self-reporting asa
consideration in the CAA amendments, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong.
2d. Sess. 343, 348, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3880.
•98. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 223.
99. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1991).
100. Literally applying this "outdoors and public places" scenario, forest and park
workers, lifeguards, door-to-door sales personnel, traffic and police officers, firefight-
ers, emergency medical personnel, letter carriers, and persons working on road main-
tenance and trash collection may be the only examples of employees working in
places that are both outdoors and public and thus protected.
101. Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 73, at 395.
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outside the physical confines of the workplace, °" virtually contra-
dicting the administrative interpretation of the statute..
Congress is not alone in using the term "ambient air" inconsistently;
the EPA itself does not follow this regulatory definition. For example,
the EPA's own regulations concerning asbestos emission violations
are not limited to releases from outside of the confines of buildings
and other enclosed structures. 10 3 During renovations of older build-
ings, friable asbestos fibers are commonly released into the air from
pipes, ceilings, and floors and then inhaled by the workforce. 1°4 The
EPA recognized that the inhalation of friable asbestos by humans is
carcinogenic and therefore listed asbestos as one of the original haz-
ardous air pollutants under the CAA.105 In 1991, the EPA promul-
gated work practice rules for handling friable asbestos releases during
building renovations. 0 6 Because friable asbestos, a common insula-
tion material, is often found inside rather than outside the enclosed
part of a building, the EPA's work practice rules protect workers from
a hazardous air pollutant that is not necessarily released into the "am-
bient air." Thus, the EPA's decision to regulate a hazardous air pollu-
tant where it is released within a building conflicts with its own agency
interpretation of "ambient air," which specifically. excludes the inte-
rior of buildings. There is no guidance from EPA explaining this con-
tradictory interpretation of the scope of "ambient air.'
0 7
The possible jurisdictional limits of the prosecution of "knowing en-
dangerment" offenses concerning a hazardous air emission of asbestos
is illustrated in the following scenario describing an apartment build-
ing renovation. 0 8 Three workers are busy at a third-floor bathroom:
the plumber, standing in the bathroom, is replacing a heating pipe that
is insulated with friable asbestos; the plumber's assistant is standing
near the bathroom window; and a third worker is standing on the fire
escape inserting a plate' of bathroom glass. Friable asbestos from the
heating pipe insulation is inhaled by the plumber and his assistant who
are not adequately equipped with breathing apparatus as required
under the EPA work practice rules. Because the asbestos was re-
leased into the inside rather than the outside air before the plumber
and his assistant inhaled the carcinogen, the employer arguably may
not be criminally culpable for this life-threatening conduct under the
102..42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(C) (1990).
103. 40 C.F.R. § 61.140 (1991).
104. Asbestos is friable when it can be crumbled in a hand when dry: 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.141 (1991).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (1970).
106. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-61.156 (1991).
107. One possible explanation is that the EPA definition of."ambient air" applies to
carbon monoxide and ozone, so-called "criterion" air pollutants, but does not apply to
asbestos and other hazardous air pollutants that are not "criterion" air pollutants.
108. It is estimated that about 30,000 of these renovations are performed in the
United States each year. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.11, at 278
(1977).
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CAA. However, only if the third worker, standing outside the build-
ing on the fire escape, inhales the released friable asbestos will the
prosecutor have jurisdiction to prosecute the employer under the stat-
ute.1°9 Ironically, it is the third worker who may be least endangered
by this release of asbestos. An emission within the confines of the
enclosed bathroom poses the greater danger of injury to the plumber
and his assistant, especially if there is inadequate ventilation." °
At least in the case of the hazardous air pollutant of asbestos, a
prosecutor may argue before a federal court that the EPA, as illus-
trated under its own work practice rules, has expanded the definition
of "ambient air" to include releases within the enclosed confines of
the workplace. However, a defendant could raise as a defense that
the EPA's conflicting application of the term "ambient air" makes
criminal prosecution under the statute void for vagueness. When a
criminal statute fails to provide "fair warning" that the contemplated
conduct is forbidden, a defendant cannot be found criminally culpa-
bie."' In any event, the above inconsistencies in interpretation by
Congress and the EPA will only provide further frustration for the
federal prosecutor.
D. And "Knows" at the Time of the Release He Places
Another in "Imminent Danger"
1. Subjective Belief of the Defendant That He Placed Another
Person in Imminent Danger
Even if a federal prosecutor overcomes the problem of proving
"willfulness" in a violator performing his or her "normal duties," and
still wishes to pursue a "knowing endangerment" criminal prosecution
under the CAA, he or she must still prove that the defendant knew at
the time of the release that he or she placed another person in immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury."' The legislative history
confirms that, for a "knowing endangerment" prosecution, it was the
intent of Congress that the "release" and the "endangerment" are
separate and distinct elements of knowledge that must be proven at
trial.113
When Congress drafted the CAA Amendments of 1990, it included
in the "knowing endangerment" provision a definition of the mens rea
necessary for commission of this element of the offense. The para-
graph provides that "the defendant is responsible only for actual
awareness or actual belief possessed.""' 4 This mens rea requirement
109. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
110. Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 73, at 394.
111. WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 2.4, at 104-05 (2d ed.
1986).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
113. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 364, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3385.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
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regarding imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to an-
other person applies to the defendant's actual and subjective belief as
to the consequences of his or her conduct.115 However, prosecutors
may establish this specific intent, the individual's belief or awareness,
through the use of circumstantial evidence, including evidence that
the defendant took affirmative' steps to be shielded from relevant in-
formation." 6 The CAA fails to give any further guidance on the
meaning of the terms "actual awareness" or "actual belief."
Importantly, however, legislative history in the Senate Conference
Report indicates that Congress had relied on CWA's "knowing endan-
germent" provision when it enacted the legal elements of CAA's
"knowing endangerment" provision."1 7 As a result, federal case law
that has interpreted terms found in CWA such as "actual awareness"
or "actual belief" is, persuasive evidence of their meaning under the
CAA." 8 In a recent prosecution under CWA's "knowing endanger-
ment" provision, the Eastern District of New York held that for the
prosecutor to show "actual awareness" or "actual belief," he or she
must demonstrate that the defendant is subjectively aware there was a
"high probability" that the danger of death or serious bodily injury is
a foreseeable consequence of his or her conduct." 9 Under this "high
probability" standard, also. known as the principle of "conscious
avoidance" or "willful blindness," the prosecutor may introduce cir-
cumstantial evidence that the defendant deliberately closed his or her
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him or her.12 0
However, it must be shown that the defendant was actually aware that
the release would place another person in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury.' 2' The district court explained that it is not
sufficient for the prosecutor to prove that the defendant was aware
that the imminent danger was merely a "potential consequence" of
the defendant's act.12 2
Applying this standard to the CAA, the prosecutor would have to
prove that the defendant, at the time of his knowing release of an air
emission into the ambient air, actually knew there was a "high
probability" that his or her conduct would endanger another person.
This "high probability" mens rea standard is a dilution of the-com-
mon-law requirement that a person have actual knowledge of the ma-
115. Korpics, supra note 79, at 460.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i), (ii) (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
117. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 29, at 363, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3384.
118. For an analogy with CWA, see United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics
Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. For a discussion of the "high probability" test, see United States v. Villegas,
784 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, United States





terial elements of the crime committed. Instead, it provides that
intentional ignorance of the facts can be used to demonstrate actual
awareness or belief. This doctrine therefore prevents corporate of-
ficers or senior managers from deliberately closing their eyes to what
is otherwise obvious to avoid responsibility for the criminal conduct of
their subordinates. 123
2. Objective Evidence of Actual Risk of Imminent Danger to
Another Person'
Even if the prosecutor proves, through circumstantial and direct ev-
idence, that the defendant subjectively was aware of a "high
probability" that his or her conduct endangered another person, the
prosecutor must then show, as a matter of fact, that an actual risk of
imminent danger had befallen the victim. "Imminent danger" is not
defined under the CAA Amendments. It is also not defined statuto-
rily under RCRA or CWA. However, federal courts often look to
precedent when an identical term has been interpreted by a federal
court.124 In United States v. Protex Industries, Inc. ,125 a "knowing en-
dangerment" prosecution under RCRA, the trial court indicated that
the term "imminent danger" represents an objective measure of actual
risk, in contrast to the subjective measure used in evaluating the de-
fendant's "knowledge.' 1 26 The trial court went on to define "immi-
nent danger" as the "existence of a condition or combination of
conditions which could reasonably be expected to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury unless the condition is remedied.' '1 27
The term "imminent danger" comprises two distinct elements, im-
minence and danger. The "danger" element is the more problematic
of the two because it can apply to two very different things: the actual
harm or the risk of the harm. As interpreted by federal courts under
other environmental statutes, the term "danger" anticipates the pre-
vention of harm and, therefore, only requires the risk or threat of
harm rather than actual harm.' 28 Accordingly, in Protex, the trial
court defined the term "danger" as a "reasonable expectation of death
or serious bodily injury."'129 This trial court instruction is in accord
with the interpretation of risk of harm under other environmental
123. E.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976).
124. Hooker Chens., 749 F.2d at 988-89.
125. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
126. Id., at 744.
127. Id.
128. Korpics, supra note 79, at 463-64. The significance of this interpretation be-
comes clear when one considers that environmental exposures to hazardous sub-
stances, such as asbestos, often do not result in immediate harm to persons, but harm
that may have a long latency period.
129. Protex Indus., 874 F.2d at 744.
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statutes, namely that "reasonable expectation" depicts risk and "death
or serious bodily injury" depicts harm. 3 '
With "danger" referring to the risk of harm rather than to the harm
itself, it follows that "imminent" will also refer to the risk rather than
to the harm itself. In the scenario of the apartment renovation and
the release of asbestos, "imminent" would apply to the onset of the
risk, the inhalation of friable asbestos, rather than the onset of any
asbestos-related disease. For instance, in Protex, the Department of
Justice argued that a present danger of future cancer risk satisfies the
"imminence" test under RCRA, and this instruction was given to the
jury at trial.131 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the issue of
future cancer risk. The court found "serious bodily injury" under the
"knowing endangerment" provision of RCRA because the workers
had suffered damage to the central nervous system as a result of the
employer's misconduct in the handling of hazardous waste. 32
E. Of "Serious Bodily Injury"
In comparison to the other elements of a knowing endangerment
crime, the extent of serious bodily injury necessary to meet the thresh-
old is relatively easy to determine because Congress defined the term
"serious bodily injury" to include:
(a) bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death;
(b) unconsciousness;
(c) extreme physical pain;
(d) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(e) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty.1 33
Congress lifted CAA's definition of "serious bodily injury" directly
from the "knowing endangerment" provision of RCRA.134 In 1980,
when Congress enacted the "knowing endangerment" provision under
RCRA, it had taken the definition of "serious bodily injury" directly
from the Proposed Criminal Code Reform Act.135 The Proposed
Criminal Code Committee Report had stated that the list of condi-
tions, constituting "serious bodily injury" is not exclusive. 136 There-
fore, types of physical injury resulting from a hazardous air emission
130. Korpics, supra note 79, at 463.
131. Protex Indus., 874 F.2d at 744.
132. Id. at 742.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134. For the similarity between the two statutes, compare the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(5)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) with RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c)(5) (1988).
135. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong.,'2d Sess. 38 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028, 5037-38.
136. S. REP. No. 553, 96th. Cong., 2d Sess. 562 (1980) (regarding the definition of
"serious bodily injury" in the Proposed Criminal Codes). ,
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release other than those listed may qualify as "serious bodily injury"
under this statutory criterion.
• Returning to our example of inhaled asbestos, a person who inhales
a release of asbestos and contracts lung cancer should meet the stan-
dard of suffering "serious bodily injury" and thus subject the "respon-
sible corporate officer" to a criminal prosecution. 137 Since lung cancer
involves bodily impairment, extreme physical pain or a substantial risk
of death, it definitely falls under the category of serious bodily in-
jury. 38 The question remains, however, whether- the risk of cancer
constitutes "serious bodily injury." In Protex, the Tenth Circuit side-
stepped the issue of whether the increased risk of cancer constitutes
sterious bodily injury." It will be the role of the federal courts to fur-
ther define its scope.
Undoubtedly, releases of hazardous air pollutants in the workplace
causing immediate injuries will meet the requirements of sustaining
serious bodily injury. As for releases of carcinogens such as asbestos
that do not manifest until years after exposure, it is uncertain how the
federal courts will decide. However, the fact that the federal district
trial court in Protex sent such an instruction to the jury, and that it was
deliberated upon, clearly illustrates that such concepts are within the
abilities of the jury and the federal courts to understand.
III. FEDERAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT
RELEASES INSIDE THE WORKPLACE
In the future, the meaning of many of the above key terms under
the CAA "knowing endangerment" provision, such as the term "am-
bient air," will be litigated in federal court. In the interim, employees
endangered by knowing releases of hazardous air emissions inside the
physical confines of the workplace may not be able to prosecute this
crime in the federal courts under the CAA Amendments. An appar-
ent alternative to prosecuting under the CAA Amendments is to pros-
ecute under OSHA, the federal statute that was enacted to ensure
worker safety. 139 In 1970, Congress enacted OSHA in an effort to
ensure safe working conditions for every man and woman in the na-
137. The criminal culpability of the "responsible corporate officer" under federal
environmental statutes is a different matter from his or her civil liability under state
law. For example, New York does not recognize claims based on speculative injuries
(so-called "cancerphobia"), but does recognize claims for medical monitoring if based
on professional medical judgment. See Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984), and Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., Inc., 566
N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
138. Korpics, supra note 79, at 475 n.194, citing P. AHMED, LIVING AND DYING
WITH CANCER, § 1-10 (1981) (physical and psychological effects of cancer in human
beings).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1995]
218 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
tion. 140 To reach this objective, the Secretary of Labor sets mandatory
"occupational safety and health standards" for the workplace. 14 1
Compliance with these standards is secured by imposing civil and
criminal sanctions for their violation.142
Unfortunately, OSHA has been an abject failure in punishing crimi-
nally culpable employer conduct since, with respect to criminal sanc-
tions, OSHA is relatively powerless. The statute provides -only
modest sanctions for criminal violations of its regulatory standards
and then only where such a violation results in an employee's death.
For example, OSHA provides for criminal fines of $10,000 and prison
terms of up to six months for willful violations of OSHA standards
that result in an employee's death.143
Due to the modest penalties available and the requirement that a
violation of OSHA standards results in an employee's death before
those penalties can be imposed, federal criminal prosecutions under
OSHA have been rare. Between 1977 and 1983, just fifteen cases
were referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecu-
tion.1' Although legislation has been proposed to increase criminal
penalties and create new OSHA criminal offenses, 145 it is uncertain
when such laws will be enacted by Congress." 6
Employees endangered by releases of air pollutants inside the
workplace will be frustrated by the limitations of federal. criminal
prosecution under OSHA or the CAA Amendments. As a result,
they may turn to state prosecutors to seek criminal prosecution under
state environmental and generic criminal statutes. The success of their
search for justice may depend upon the willingness of state prosecu-
tors and the state courts to answer their call.
IV. STATE PROSECUTION OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT
RELEASES, IN THE WORKPLACE THAT ENDANGER EMPLOYEES
A. The Role of State Prosecutors in Ensuring Worker Safety
During the pist decade, state prosecutors, especially in the industri-
alized northeast, have taken an active role in pursuing environmental
criminal cases that directly impact upon worker safety. In 1985, the
New York State Attorney General created a specialized enforcement
140. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1988).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988).
144. Peter J. Romantowski, Workplace Crimes: Federal and State Enforcement, in
CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 1991, at 264 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. C4-4199, 1991).
145. Id. at 267.
•146. Id.
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unit called the Environmental Protection Bureau. 147 A principal focus
of this unit has been the criminal prosecution of employer conduct
concerning hazardous substances that endanger worker safety.148
The increased interest of the New York State Attorney General and
other state prosecutors in worker safety and environmental crime has
arisen for at least two reasons. 149 One reason stems from the ineffec-
tiveness of OSHA in criminally punishing employer conduct that en-
dangers the health of the workforce of a state where such injury
commonly occurs. 151 In New York State, occupational disease is the
fourth leading cause of death. 15 1 Between 1983 and 1985, there were
at least 735 toxic chemical accidents which killed at least twenty-two
people, injured at least 267, and forced thousands of employees and
nearby residents to evacuate. 152 Clearly, such pervasive workplace
endangerment mandates the use of state prosecutions accompanied
with severe criminal sanctions.
A second reason for increased state prosecutor involvement was the
encouragement provided by state courts in the early 1980s that im-
posed severe sanctions against corporate officers for criminally culpa-
ble conduct. In 1983, an Illinois State Court imposed a twenty-five-
year term of imprisonment on a film recovery company president,
plant manager, and foreman. for the death of an employee whose job
was to stir unventilated tanks of sodium cyanide.' 53 This case was the
first under state law in which corporate officers had been convicted of
murder for acts or omissions related to their status and responsibilities
in the hierarchy of a corporation. 154
Due to the many legal hurdles federal prosecutors may face under
the CAA Anendment's "knowing endangerment" provision, it is un-
likely that there will be many federal criminal prosecutions of hazard-
ous air releases within the confines of an enclosed workplace. State
prosecutors may be asked to fill this void in enforcement of environ-
mental and occupational safety standards in the workplace. Unfortu-
147. Robert Abrams, The Maturing Discipline of Environmental Prosecution, 16
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 282 (1991).
148. Id. at -284.
149. Clive Morrick, The Prosecutor and the Workplace: Killing Two Birds With One
Stone, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Mar. 1989, at 9, 11.
150. Abrams, supra note 147, at 285 (OSHA had issued citations to the violating
company for 13 years prior 'to state prosecution for endangering workers, with no
results).
151. Id. at 284.
152. NEW YORK STATE ATrORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF JOINT PUBLIC HEAR-
INGS ON Toxic CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (1986) (available from
the Office of Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau).
153. People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (IlM. 1990) (reversed convictions for murder
on other grounds-legal inconsistency of murder and manslaughter convictions).
154. Kenneth M. KoprowicZ, Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace Hazards:
A Viable Option for Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 183 (1986).
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nately, state prosecutors may face their own unique set of legal
challenges if they attempt to fill this important role.
The first of these legal challenges some state prosecutors may face is
determining whether OSHA preempts the state from prosecuting em-
ployers for conduct that is regulated by OSHA.'5 5 Under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,156 federal law may pre-
empt state law in one of three ways:
(1) It may preempt state law expressly when Congress explicitly
provides for preemption in a statute.1 57
(2) It may preempt state law impliedly when the federal law is so
comprehensive that there is no room for any supplemental state
law.158
(3) It may preempt conflicting state law when compliance with
both federal and state law is a physical impossibility. 1
59
In New York, Illinois, and some other highly industrialized states,
OSHA preemption has been raised- and rejected by the state courts as
a defense to state prosecution. For example, in Illinois, pre-emption
was raised by the defendant officers of Chicago Magnet Wire Corp. in
a state environmental criminal prosecution brought by the State At-
torney of Cook County, Illinois.' 6° The traditional penal law count of
reckless conduct, in pertinent part, charged that the defendants had
unreasonably exposed forty-two employees to "poisonous and stupe-
fying, substances" in the workplace and had prevented those employ-
ees from protecting themselves by "failing to provide necessary safety
instructions and sundry health monitoring systems'.' 161
The trial court dismissed the indictment, holding that OSHA
preempts the state from prosecuting employers for conduct that is
governed by federal occupational health and safety standards.' 62 The
Supreme Court of Illinois, however, reversed the judgments of the
trial and appellate courts and allowed the conviction of the corpora-
tion and its named officers. 1
63
In People v. Pymm, 164 a New York State environmental criminal
prosecution brought jointly by the State Attorney General and the
Kings County District Attorney, the defendants, Pymm Thermometer
155. OSHA does not preempt state action in areas where no standard is in effect.
29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988). See also Abrams, supra note 147, at 285-87.
156. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
157. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
158. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1986).
159. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
160. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989).
161. Id. at 963.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. People v. Pymm, No. 930/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.' 1986), rev'd, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871
(App. Div. 1989), aff'd 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991),
discussed in Abrams, supra note 147, at 285.
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Corp. president William Pymm, plant manager Edward Pymm, and a
foreman, also raised OSHA preemption as a defense. In Pymm,
maintenance workers were ordered by their employer to recover mer-
cury by smashing defective thermometers in a cellar factory that con-
tained no effective ventilation.165  One of the workers, Vidal
Rodriguez, was diagnosed as suffering mercury vapor poisoning and
brain damage as a result of performing these work duties for the
c6rporation. 66After a jury trial, the defendants were convicted of thegeneric state
penal crimes of Assault in the First Degree, Assault in the Second
Degree, Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in
the Fifth Degree, and Falsifying Business Records in the First De-
gree. 167 The trial court, however, set aside the verdict, holding that
the uniform enforcement scheme of OSHA had preempted the state
from enforcing stricter workplace standards through criminal prosecu-
tion and that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the con-
spiracy and reckless endangerment counts.168
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and reinstated the
convictions.' 69 The court held that, in matters of health and safety,
the state power to prosecute criminal conduct is not restricted in the
absence of compelling congressional direction and that under OSHA,
there is no evidence of any such intent.170 The goals of the state crimi-
nal law complement rather than conflict with the goal of OSHA in
ensuring worker safety.' 7' The New York State Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the Appellate Division.172 The subsequent ap-
plication for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme
Court.17
3
Even if OSHA does not preempt state criminal prosecution of con-
duct that endangers employees, there remains the question of what
types of state criminal laws can be used to effectively prosecute haz-
ardous air pollutant releases that endanger the health and safety of
the workers and other persons in the workplace. In many states, such
as New York, there are a number of generic and specifically tailored
criminal statutes that may be effectively utilized by state prosecutors.
165. Of course the defendants' own offices were separately enclosed and properly
ventilated. Abrams, supra note 147, at 285.
166. Id
167. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05(4), 120.20(1), 175.10, 105.00 (McKinney 1988).
168. People v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 563 N.E.2d 1
(N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).
169. Id. at 876.
170. Id. at 873-74.
171. Id. at 876.
172. People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).
173. People v. Pymm, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991) (denying writ of certiorari).
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B. Traditional State Criminal Law Statutes ,That Can Complement
or Surpass the Federal Clean Air Act Crime of "Knowing
Endangerment" in Ensuring Worker Safety
State penal law statutes have been used successfully in New York
and other industrialized states in prosecuting corporate officers and
other senior management personnel who have released hazardous air
pollutants inside the workplace that endangered or injured employees..
Penal law statutes can be a powerful prosecutorial weapon for punish-
ing such criminal conduct that may not otherwise be successfully pros-
ecuted under the federal provisions of the CAA Amendments.
There are a number of reasons for the increased use of traditional
state penal law in lieu of, or as a complement to, specifically tailored
criminal environmental statutes. Many state and local prosecutors
have relied upon state penal law to avoid confronting the technical
regulations that underlie many state environmental statutes. Prosecu-
tors, as well as judges and juries, are often more comfortable with
traditional "bread and butter" crimes such as assault, larceny, or for-
gery, which demystify an environmental trial. These crimes, in con-
trast to many environmental offenses, are also accompanied by a well-
established body of case law upon which to rely. Although the stigma
attached to a corporation or officer charged with an environmental
offense may be considerable, if the same indictment charges tradi-
tional criminal offenses, the stigma and accompanying deterrence
value increases accordingly.
An illustration of the scope and effect of such a state penal law
prosecution involves the tragic death of an Illinois worker named
Steven Golab. 174 In 1983, Steven Golab, a fifty-nine-year-old illegal
immigrant from Poland, had worked for a year stirring tanks of so-
dium cyanide at the Film Recovery Services plant in Elk Grove, Illi-
nois.1 75 Film Recovery employees, many of whom were illegal
immigrants, used a cyanide solution to extract silver from used x-ray
and photographic film.'76 Stephen Golab and many of his fellow em-
ployees who worked at the cyanide tanks had experienced headaches,
nausea, and burning skin from inhaling the toxic cyanide fumes. 7 7
On February 10, 1983, after Golab had disconnected a pump on one
of the tanks and stirred the cyanide contents of the tank with a rake,
he became dizzy and then fainted.178 Golab's body trembled and his
mouth foamed as he went into a convulsion. 179 He was rushed to the
hospital where he died later that day.180 An autopsy determined that








he had died of cyanide poisoning from his inhalation of these toxic
fumes.181
After the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("Ad-
ministration")' 82 had conducted an investigation of this worker fatal-
ity, it fined the plant $4855 for twenty safety violations surrounding
this egregious conduct,. but later halved the penalty.' 83 The Illinois
State Attorney for Cook County, however, took a much more aggres-
sive stance, fining the company $24,000 and filing state criminal
charges against the company and its officials." I
On June 14, 1985, three of the corporate officials of Film Recovery
Services were convicted by the Cook County court of murder for Ste-
phen Golab's death.'8 5 The state court found that three of the corpo-
rate officials, Steven O'Neil, Charles Kirschbaum, and Daniel
Rodriguez, officers and high managerial agents of Film Recovery, had
on February 10, 1983, knowingly created a strong probability of Go-
lab's death."8 In substance, the corporate officers failed to tell Golab
that he was handling a dangerous substance and failed to provide ade-
quate training and safety equipment -for the performance of his
duties. 187
This environmental prosecution for worker homicide resulting from
a hazardous air release using a penal statute provided an impetus for
other states. For instance, in a small factory located in Brooklyn, New
York, the Pymm Thermometer Corporation was manufacturing ther-
mometers.' 88 To the alarm of OSHA, in the unventilated basement of
this factory,, workers recovered mercury by smashing broken ther-
mometers.' 89 The employees who inhaled these mercury fumes suf-
fered a number of physical maladies.'" The corporation's president
and a number of corporate officials were convicted under four tradi-
tional criminal provisions, Reckless Endangerment in the Second De-
181. Id.
182. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was established by
OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1988).
183. Note, Getting Away With Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Crimi-
nal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 535 (1987).
. 184. Id.
185. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1091 (Banks, J., sitting without a jury). Murder is de-
fined under Illinois state law as follows:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder
if, in performing the acts which cause the death: he knows that such acts
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a)(2) (1981).
186. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1091.
187. Id. The officials were also convicted of 14 counts of reckless conduct involving
14 other Film Recovery employees. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5(a) (1981).
188. People v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 563 N.E.2d 1
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gree, Assault in the Second Degree, Falsifying Business Records in
the First Degree, and Conspiracy in the Fifth Degree.19 '
Of particular interest were the convictions for reckless endanger-
ment and assault."9 In proving the reckless endangerment charge, the
prosecutor showed that the defendants knew there was a substantial
risk of injury to one or more factory workers, and that the corpora-,
tion's officers unreasonably disregarded that risk. These elements
were demonstrated by not only the lack of protective wear provided
for the workers, but, more importantly, by the fact that the corporate
officers provided safety equipment for themselves. 93 The ,mercury
poisoning suffered by one worker, Vidal Rodriguez, indicated that in-
halation of mercury vapors can cause serious physical injury. 9 4
The evidence at trial also showed that the corporate officers com-
mitted assault in the second degree by recklessly allowing an em-
ployee, Vidal Rodriguez, to inhale the mercury vapors during the
mercury reclamation process, causing him to suffer a number of seri-
ous physical ailments. 9 5 In Pymm, physical injury was proven by
medical evidence showing that Rodriguez had suffered mercury
poisoning by inhaling the toxic vapors. 196 The dangerous instrument
with which Rodriguez had been assaulted was mercury, a hazardous
substance as lethal as any assault rifle or handgun when handled with-
out proper safety equipment.' 97
Pymm represents the first penal law conviction involving workplace
exposure to toxic chemicals in New York State history.198 This will
not be the last such conviction as more local district attorneys
throughout New York State use traditional criminal laws to prosecute
corporate environmental safety misconduct that endangers the health
of employees in the workplace.
191. Id at 871.
192. Id Paper crimes such as false filings, forgery and similar penal law offenses
can also be used in appropriate cases. For examples of New York statutes, see N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 170.00-170.30 (McKinney 1988) (forgery and related offenses) and
§§ 175.00-175.45 (McKinney 1988) (offenses involving false statements).
193. Abrams, supra note 147, at 284-85.
194. Id Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree is committed when a per-
son "recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical
injury to another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 1988).
195. Abrams, supra note 147, at 284-85. Assault- in the Second Degree it commit-
ted when a person "Recklessly causes physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(4) (McKinney
1988).
196. Abrams, supra note 147, at 284-85.
197. Id.
198. Robert Abrams & Douglas H. Ward, Prospects for Safer Communities: Emer-
gency Response, Community Right to Know and Prospects for Safer Communities, 14
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (1990).
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C. State Criminal Environmental Statutes That Can Complement or
Surpass the Federal Clean Air Act Crime of "Knowing
Endangerment" in Ensuring Worker Safety
In addition to traditional penal law crimes, similar to those used in
Pymm, a state prosecutor may use specifically tailored state environ-
mental criminal statutes against environmental or other worker safety
violators. Many of these state environmental statutes mirror or are'
more stringent than their federal counterparts.
Because the state environmental statutes and'accompanying regula-
tions are often complex and arcane, prosecutors have used, where ap-
plicable, the mens rea of recklessness'" or criminal negligence, which
require proof of a lower culpable mental state on the part of the ac-
cused. In an environmental prosecution, proving culpable mental
state and explaining it to the jury is often biggest hurdle for the state.
In light of the difficulty in proving the accused's culpable mental
state, Congress and federal courts have eased the prosecutor's burden
of proving mental culpability. Many federal environmental crimes re-
quire only proof of general intent, and often the prosecutor need not
prove intent for every element of the charged offense. Additionally,
federal courts and Congress have authorized the use of evidentiary
presumptions, such as those found in the "responsible corporate of-
ficer" doctrine and "conscious avoidance" liability to ease the prose-
cutor's burden of showing mental culpability for corporate officers
who are not the "hands on actors" of the charged environmental
offense.
It is uncertain whether state courts of industrialized states such as
New York will follow the lead set by federal courts in adopting a simi-
lar relaxation of mens rea requirements for public welfare offenses
such as environmental crimes. In New York, the state Environmental
Conservation Law ("ECL"), 2 °° already provides some of the statutory
groundwork. For instance, following the course of federal environ-
mental statutes, the term "person" is broadly defined under the ECL
and includes a "responsible corporate officer. '20 1 Of particular inter-
est to the state prosecutor in New York ,is whether the responsible
corporate officer doctrine applies to the prosecution of an environ-
mental crime in a state court. At this time, there are no reported deci-
sions of the use of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine in a
state environmental prosecution in New York. At least one legal com-
mentator has reservations about whether the New York state courts
would allow a conviction based, in part, upon the responsible. corpo-
199. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 227-35 (difficulty with "knowing" standard
,and use of "reckless" standard).
200. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-1009 (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1995).
201. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 71-1932(3) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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rate officer doctrine where a defendant faced-potential imprisonment
rather than a fine.2 °2
A related question is whether the New York State courts will follow
the federal courts in holding that in public welfare offenses, such as
environmental crimes, the prosecutor need not prove a specific mental
state such as "knowledge" or "intent," in every element of a charged
offense. The New York State Court of Appeals has held that crimes
listed in the ECL are public welfare offenses and therefore should be
liberally construed.20 3
At the same time, however, the ECL provides that the interpreta-
tion of its criminal provisions is guided by the New York Penal Law,
which to the contrary, is to be strictly construed. Specifically, under
the mental culpability requirements provided under the New York Pe-
nal Law, it is presumed that a culpable mental state applies to every
element of an offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly
appears. 2 °4 There is no case law addressing whether this restriction
also applies to crimes outside the Penal Law. In light of this statutory
reference, it is uncertain whether a state trial court will have the dis-
cretion to apply the culpability requirement to just some of the ele-
ments of an environmental crime as is common for other public
welfare offenses. 20 This issue and the relaxation of other similar evi-
dentiary burdens of proving criminal intent must be addressed by New
York and other industrialized states before state prosecutors will be
able to successfully prosecute many otherwise culpable environmental.
violators who endanger the workplace.
In response to these uncertainties in the state courts- of New York
and other industrialized states in proving the criminal intent of envi-
ronmental violators, state legislatures have enacted innovative envi-
ronmental legislation to ease the prosecutor's burden. For instance,
under the state environmental criminal laws in the State of Ohio, state
prosecutors can use the mental state of "recklessness" rather than
"knowledge" to successfully prosecute and incarcerate environmental
violators.2° Under this "recklessness" standard, state prosecutors in
Ohio have found it is easier to prosecute corporate environmental vio-
lators, especially high-level corporate managers, than under the fed-
eral "knowledge" standard even with the latter's array of relaxed
evidentiary burdens of proof such as the "responsible corporate of-
ficer" doctrine.2 °7
202. Clive Morrick, The Mental Culpability Requirements for Proof of Environmen-
tal Crimes in New York, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 265 (1991).
203. People v. J.R. Cooperage Co., 515 N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. Div. 1987), modified,
137 A.D.2d 572, aff'd, 531 N.E.2d 1285 (N.Y. 1988).
204. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15 (1) (McKinney 1988).
205. Morrick, supra note 202, at 255.
206. Celebrezze et al., supra note 1, at 230.
207. Id
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In other states, there are specifically tailored state environmental
laws that may be expeditiously used even without similar federal evi-
dentiary aids or the culpability standard of recklessness. For example,
in New York, the "endangering statute,"208 enacted by the New York
state legislature in 1986 to criminalize releases of hazardous air emis-
sions that endanget workers may prove to be a powerful weapon for
state prosecutors. This statute, officially titled "Endangering Public
Health, Safety or the Environment," was enacted in response to the
1984 accident in Bhopal, India, in which a cloud of toxic gas from a
Union Carbide pesticide plant had killed thousands of people.20 9 A
subsequent survey by the Attorney General of the State of New York
had concluded that such a. fatality could happen in New York State
where thousands of pounds of toxic chemicals are accidentally re-
leased into the environment each year.210
This "endangerment" statute provides a range of felony-level sanc-
tions for any knowing or reckless release of a hazardous substance
that endangers public health, safety, or the environment.211 The basic
scope of this statute includes any conduct accompanied by a culpable
mental state leading to the unauthorized release of a substance that is
hazardous to public health or safety or the environment. This stat-
ute's scope is innovative and expansive to environmental criminal law
enforcement because it applies whether the release is a gas, liquid, or
solid.
The sanctions under this criminal environmental statute can be se-
vere. For the knowing intent crime of "Endangering Public Health,
Safety or the Environment in the Second Degree," a Class D felony,
the maximum indeterminate term is seven years imprisonment.212 In
addition, the defendant is subject to a fine of up to $150,000 or twice213
the amount gained from the criminal conduct. A person is guilty of
this offense when:
he knowingly... engages in conduct which causes the a) release to
the environment of a substance acutely hazardous to public health,
safety or the environment and b) such release causesphysical injury
to any person who is not a participant in the crime.
The New York "endangerment statute" may empower state prose-
cutors to more readily prosecute corporate criminal conduct, concern-
ing any media, such as' hazardous air pollutant releases, that endanger
208. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2710 to 71-2714 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
209. Abrams, supra note 147, at 282-85 (discussing the passage of New York's "en-
dangering statute," 1986 N.Y. LAWS 671 codified in N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW§§ 71-2710 to 71-2714 (McKinney Supp. 1995)).
210. Abrams, supra note 147, at 282-83.
211. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2712, 71-2714 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
212. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(02)(d) (McKinney 1988).
213. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2721(2)(b), (f) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
214. Id. § 71-2713(1) (McKinney Supp.,1995).
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the health or safety of employees, because it does not have the juris-
dictional limitations of the federal "knowing endangerment crime"
under the CAA. For instance, this state statute may be used regard-
less of whether the hazardous air release occurred inside or outside
the enclosed confines of the workplace. In contrast to the federal reg-
ulatory limits upon the scope of a release into -the "ambient air,"
under the state ECL, the definition of a "release" '215 into the "environ-
ment" 216 is expansive. In particular, the broad definition of "release"
under that statute provides jurisdiction whether or not the hazardous
substance entered the environment at the time it endangered the
victim.
Determining whether the released, air emission is a hazardous or
acutely hazardous substance release under the ECL is simple; the sub-
stances are listed pursuant to implementing regulations under the
statute.217
To determine the meaning of "physical injury" under this endanger-
ing crime, one simply turns to its statutory definition under the New
York State Penal Law. 218 Also, in prosecutions where an "acutely"
hazardous substance is knowingly released into the environment,
there is no requirement to even demonstrate physical injury to the
victim. 2 19 Therefore, problems of proving causation found in the fed-
eral "knowing endangerment" crimes such as those under the CAA,
are avoided altogether under -the state endangering statute for certain
air emissions such as asbestos.
In the case of hazardous air emissions that endanger workers, there
are other felony-level "endangering" crimes under the ECL that may
be easier for a state prosecutor to prove culpability in addition to the
crime of Endangering Public Health, Safety or the Environment in the
Second Degree. For instance, under the reckless standard, the release
into the environment of an acutely hazardous substance, such as as-
bestos, may be prosecuted as a Class E felony, regardless of whether
or not physical injury had befallen the victim as a result of the defend-
ant's conduct.2 In sum, at least in New York, using the state endan-
germent statute to prosecute hazardous air releases that endanger
workers may be much easier than using any other state environmental
215. "Release" means "any pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, or leaching, di-
rectly or indirectly, of a substance so that the substance or any related constituent
thereof, or any degradation product of such substance or of related constituent
thereof, may enter the environment, or the disposal of any substance." Id. § 71-
2702(13) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
216. "Environment" is defined as "any water, water vapor, any land including land
surface or subsurface, air fish, wildlife, biota, and all other natural resources." Id.
§ 71-2702(12) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
217. Id. § 37-0103 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
218. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9) (McKinney 1988) ("impairment of physical condi-
tion or substantial pain").
219. Id. § 71-2713(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
-220. Id. § 71-2712 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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criminal statutes. This statute, when combined with the innovative
use of traditional state penal law crimes such as assault, larceny, or
forgery, will certainly provide a potential state criminal enforcement
arsenal to offset the apparent limitations of the crime of "knowing
endangerment" under the CAA.
CONCLUSION
The "knowing endangerment" provisions under RCRA and CWA
have been hailed by legal commentators as "the wave of the future"
for federal. prosecutors.22 1 This positive feedback may not apply to
the latest "knowing endangerment" crime enacted by Congress under
the CAA Amendments of 1990. New burdens of proof and am'bigu-
ous legal terms inserted into this provision by Congress in the spirit of
political compromise may turn the CAA Amendments' "knowing en-
dangerment" crime into little more than a "gold mine" of litigation for
federal defense attorneys.
Although these legal hurdles may hinder federal prosecutors, the
weaknesses of the knowing endangerment crime under the CAA
Amendments may provide an opportunity for state prosecutors in
their traditional role as protectors of the workplace. Innovative crimi-
nal prosecutions under traditional criminal statutes and under the
state "endangerment" statute may provide greater assurance of a
workplace safe from air pollutants than may ever result under the
CAA.
Only the passage of time will tell whether state prosecutors have the
inclination and innovation to meet this challenge. In the interim, the
health and safety of thousands in the workforce of New York and
other industrialized states remain at peril.
221. Romantowski, supra note 144, at 272.
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